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Duke Law Journal 
VOLUME 1987 NOVEMBER NUMBER 5 
FEDERALISM, CONGRESS, THE STATES AND 
THE TENTH AMENDMENT: ADRIFT IN 
THE CELLOPHANE SEA 
WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE* 
Like GauL this essay is divided into three parts. The first two parts 
are adapted from a public address delivered at the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York, as part of its Bicentennial series, in 1987. The 
third part was added later, originally as an Addendum Note. 
The general subject was introduced by the moderator, Mr. Robert 
Macerate, President of the Amerian Bar Association, who put the follow-
ing question: "Where does the federalism of the Constitution stand to-
day?" Professor Martha Field of the Harvard Law School presented a 
paper in first response. This paper then followed, and both will eventually 
appear with a number of other papers in book form, by Random House, 
some time in 1988 or 1989. 
The metaphor of "the cellophane sea" in the title is borrowed from a 
dissent by Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Kahriger, demurring to 
the suggestion that enumerated-power nominalism is the sole test of feder-
alism judicial review. I wholly agree with that dissent. The argument 
presented here is that the same kind of "illegitimate use" analysis Frank-
furter invoked in the cellophane-wrapped tax case is, contrary to the con-
ventional view, equally applicable to commerce power cases and every other 
enumerated power case as well. 
At one point (toward the end of Part I), a hypothetical act of Congress 
is proposed. The reader is invited to choose between two mutually exclu-
sive ways of resolving its constitutionality, as suggested alternatively, in 
Part IL Part III revisits the general problem of navigating the cellophane 
sea. 
* Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. 
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I. THE FEDERALISM OF THE CONSTITUTION 
A. 
Federalism, generally, is that form of government "in which a union 
of states recognizes the sovereignty of a central authority while retaining 
certain residual powers of government."' Constitutional federalism 
stands approximately midway between mere confederacy and the na-
tional state within which the paramount principle is that of democratic 
centralism.2 
Federalism in our own constitutional order describes the division of 
political power by subject matter between the national government and 
the fifty states. It means that what the Constitution allocates (in its own 
words "delegates") to the national government to do, the national gov-
ernment may do as it likes, 3 including maintaining massive armed forces, 
borrowing hugely on the national credit and declaring all out war.4 
What the Constitution does not authorize the national government to do 
may still be done, but if it may-a matter, incidentally, the Constitution 
does not decide5-still it may not be done by Congress. Rather, it must 
be done only on a more local basis, usually state by state. "Federalism" 
is thus an expression of constitutional shorthand respecting the vertical 
distribution of legislative jurisdiction in the United States. 
The boundaries of federalism are partly determined in the first in-
stance pursuant to the doctrine of enumerated ppwers: by specifying af-
firmatively what Congress is empowered to do-principally in the 
I. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 494 (2d College ed. 1982). 
2. Compare our Constitution with the modem Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. KONST. SSSR [USSR Constitution] art. 3, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON THE So-
VIET LEGAL SYSTEM 3, 5 (W. Butler ed. & trans. 1983) ("[T]he Soviet state shall be structured in 
accordance with the principle of democratic centralism .... "). 
3. Subject only to such restrictions as cut across its enumerated powers, e.g., restrictions found 
in article I, section 9, and those set forth in the Bill of Rights. 
4. It has been insisted that "the Constitution ... is not a suicide pact." Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (Goldberg, J.) (paraphrasing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 
37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). In some respects, however, the Constitution does take that risk. 
In granting shape and substance to a national government that is unchecked in its power to put the 
entire country at risk through its combined foreign affairs and war powers, the Constitution is a 
gamble that that decision-to provide for a national government vested with such discretion-will 
not be disastrous in the end. 
5. The Constitution is not the affirmative source of such power as each state government may 
or may not finally exercise; rather, those powers must, according to each state"s own constitution, be 
justified within each state. The tenth amendment takes care to note this fact. It designates in whose 
favor (the states) powers not delegated to the United States are reserved, contingent, however, on 
each state government's ability to me•!t the affirmative demands of its own constitution. See infra 
note 15 and accompanying text. 
Vol. 1987:769] CELLOPHANE SEA 771 
enumerations provided in article I, section 86-the Constitution provides 
what things may be done in the manner that Congress decides. When 
expressed in law within those specifications, the will of Congress controls 
subject only to such -limitations as arise from the Bill of Rights and a few 
similar restrictions appearing elsewhere in the Constitution itself.? Con-
gress's entitlement to control in all such matters, moreover, is not left in 
doubt; it is expressly confirmed by the supremacy clause of article VI. 
Pursuant to that clause, every judge in every court-whether state or 
national-is bound by constitutional oath to give Congress's acts full 
faith and effect as controlling law, "any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. "8 
With respect to things not specified in this manner, however, what 
Congress may want-indeed, what substantial national majorities may 
want-generally does not matter in the least. No matter how large such 
majorities are nationally, they are not empowered on that account to 
have their way.9 Rather, it is the success and failure of appeals within 
6. In addition, see the scattered provisions respecting affirmative powers vested in Congress in 
articles II through VI, as well as in the enabling sections of several subsequent amendments (e.g., 
thirteenth amendment, section 2; fourteenth amendment, section 5; fifteenth amendment, section 2; 
sixteenth amendment). 
7. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting Congress from suspending habeas corpus, 
enacting bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, etc.). 
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
9. The point was raised {albeit unavailingly) this last Term by Justice Marshall, dissenting in 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2105 (1987). A majority of the Court sustained an unprec-
edented "preventive detention" act of Congress. But, as Justice Marshall noted: 
The Constitution does not contain an explicit delegation to the Federal Government of the 
power to define and administer the general criminal law .... The majority nowhere identi-
fies the constitutional source of congressional power to authorize the federal detention of 
persons whose predicted future conduct would not violate any federal statute and could not 
be punished by a federal court. I can only conclude that the Court's frequently expressed 
concern with the principles of federalism vanishes when it threatens to interfere with the 
Court's attainment of the desired result. 
/d. at 2108 n.4. Indeed, it frequently appears to do just that. 
Similarly, in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504 (1957), Justice Harlan dissented from the 
Court's decision sustaining a federal anti-obscenity statute (nominally adopted under the postal 
power) on federalism grounds. Unlike the states, he noted: 
Congress has no substantive power over sexual morality .... 
. . . [T]he dangers of federal censorship in this field are far greater than anything the 
States may do . 
. . . The danger is perhaps not great if the people of one State, through their legisla-
ture, decide that [certain publications are] non-sellable, for the State next door is still free to 
make its own choice. 
/d. at 504-06 (emphasis added). 
The same general point was made equally by Justice Brandeis: "It is one of the happy incidents 
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice 
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.; dissenting) (emphasis added). Thus, feder-
alism ensures that a single state's practice, however unique, wiii be protected from attempts by the 
intolerant or the fearful to enforce uniformity upon that state via congressional fiat. 
772 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:769 
more localized communities of sentiment that controls, usually just state 
by state. Pluralism and localized choice, insubordinate to nationalism, in 
brief, are the residual constitutional rule. 
The prerogative of federalism from this perspective is at bottom a 
prerogative of diversity among state regimes of law and of culture, be-
yond the veto of others whom it may affront and beyond congressional 
command for uniformity of behavior or oflaw.10 The extent of that pre-
rogative, moreover, has nothing to do with the separate limitations 
thrown onto Congress by the Bill of Rights. Indeed, it antedates the Bill 
of Rights and in several respects grants greater space than does the Bill 
of Rights. A significantly refashioned national government came into 
existence in 1789 with such powers as its formulating charter, the Consti-
tution, affirmatively furnished it; but it derived no powers from on high 
and carried over none from the Articles of Confederation except to the 
extent they were expressly and affirmatively provided for when ratifica-
tion of the document enumerating those powers was sought, in 1787. 11 
Writing of the Constitution for the Supreme Court in 1805, Chief 
Justice Marshall confirmed this doctrine: "[U]nder a constitution con-
ferring specific powers, the power contended for must be granted, or it 
cannot be exercised."12 And as Justice Brewer repeated for the Supreme 
Court in 1907: "[T]he proposition that there are legislative powers ... 
not expressed in the grant of powers [to Congress], is in direct conflict 
with the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers."13 
The constitutional assurance of federalism in the sense just de-
scribed was not left to inference.14 Rather, an express, precautionary 
bookend was added to the Bill of Rights to make the matter textually 
explicit-to designate expressly in whose favor powers not "delegated" 
to the United States were reserved: 
10. See supra note 9; see also Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 31 J. LEGAL Eouc. 
153, 155-56 (I 987) (arguing that federalism checks sovereignty by allowing states to compete for 
"residents, businesses, and tax dollars"). Under federalism, the states are constrained in a manner 
that Congress is not, insofar as each is aware that people may exercise their constitutional right to 
exit and take up elsewhere. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941) (state statute 
criminalizing bringing of nonresident indigents into state an unconstitutional burden on interstate 
commerce); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,49 (1867) (implying constitutional right of free 
interstate movement by overturning state tax on common carrier passengers leaving state). For a 
recent review of these matters, see McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. 
CHl. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1507 (1987). 
11. Cf. Van Alstyne, Implied Powers, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
962-66 (L. Levy, K. Karst & D. Mahoney eds. 1986) (comparing six different uses of implied 
powers). 
12. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 395 (1805). 
13. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907). 
14. I.e., the inference that what is not affirmatively conferred is impliedly denied (expressio 
unius, exclusio alterius est). 
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The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people. 15 
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From 1781 to 1787, the Articles of Confederation had set the sole 
terms of national government, in its lesser specifications of weakly enu-
merated national powers. The felt deficiencies in those enumerations led 
to the Annapolis and Philadelphia conventions.16 The measures pro-
posed in Philadelphia were proposed to form a more perfect union17-a 
union more perfect to the extent of extending to Congress enumerations 
of authority it previously lacked. Many subjects (e.g., the divorce or de-
scent laws of the several states) were not in dispute at the time, however, 
and no proposals were made or adopted to confide any general power to 
Congress. Nor was this a casual matter at all; rather, it was stressed 
repeatedly by the Constitution's proponents. 
Indeed, the relative proportion of matters left unaffected, even 
before the addition of the tenth amendment (to settle in whose favor 
powers not delegated to Congress had been reserved), was stressed by its 
single most prominent draftsman. It was not in reference to the Articles 
of Confederation that Madison wrote the following assessment and reas-
surance (as one might otherwise suppose). Rather, he wrote it in respect 
to the proposed Constitution itself: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal gov-
ernment are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite. 18 
15. U.S. CoNST. amend. X. In expressly designating in whose favor powers not delegated are 
reserved, the tenth amendment provides an express federalism marker which ought not be lightly 
dismissed as merely tautological of the doctrine of enumerated powers. The doctrine of enumerated 
powers, standing alone, is ideologically indifferent to federalism interests; the tenth amendment is 
not. To put the same matter somewhat differently, applying the doctrine of enumerated powers with 
no tenth amendment sense leads one away from the understanding that federalism is not an exercise 
simply to see how wide one hand (Congress) can be made to swing (through the "interpretation" of 
its enumerated powers); there is supposed to be another "hand" out there that claps against this 
hand and not just empty space to be filled up by nationalism. The tenth amendment is a significant 
counter referent against which the fairness of interpreting enumerated powers may be measured. Its 
dismissal as a "truism" by Justice Stone in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) was 
more hubris than insight, a reflection of judicial values in the age of the national state. 
16. Under the Articles of Confederation, the national government could not exercise control 
over the states in the essential functions of taxation, regulation of trade or enforcement of treaty 
obligations. See NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY 
JAMES MADISON at XVIII (A. Koch ed. 1966); see also id. at 29-30 (remarks of Mr. Randolph, May 
29, 1787) (Randolph enumerated five defects of the Articles of Confederation: the Articles granted 
no authority to (1) prevent or support war, or provide security against foreign invasion; (2) check 
quarrels between states; (3) provide general benefits, such as the regulation of interstate commerce; 
(4) defend itself against encroachments of states; and (5) declare itself paramount over state 
constitutions.). 
17. U.S. CONST. preamble (emphasis added). 
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (J. Madison) (M. Beloff ed. 1987). 
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Thus The Federalist put the basic proposition publicly, in James 
Madison's essay, 19 during the ratification debates. Nor was it left in 
doubt who was expected to make good on this understanding-assuredly 
not Congress (what an odd Catch-22 that would be), but rather the 
courts, in the course of judicial review. As Hamilton emphatically put it: 
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional 
judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon 
them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, 
that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be col-
lected from any particular provisions in the constitution .... It is far 
more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an inter-
mediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among 
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their 
authority. 20 
Accordingly, article III emphasized that the judicial power would extend 
to all cases "arising under this Constitution,"21 including most promi-
nently22 federalism cases, the point being by this means to keep the Con-
gress "within the limits assigned to their authority,"23 and not allow it to 
presume to the regulation of things not committed to its discretion. In-
deed, this was declared as the most important judicial task.24 
19. Marshall relied heavily on The Federalist, calling it "a work now acknowledged by all to be 
a clear and a just exposition of the constitution." G. GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF 
McCu/loc/z v. Maryland 194 (1969) (footnote omitted); cf Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) ("It is illumi-
nating for purposes of reflection, if not for argument, to note that one of the greatest 'fictions' of our 
federal system is that the Congress exercises only those powers delegated to it, while the remainder 
are reserved to the States or to the people. The manner in which this Court has construed the Com-
merce Clause amply illustrates the extent of this fiction." (emphasis added)). 
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 398 (A. Hamilton) (M. Belolf ed. 1987) (emphasis added); see 
also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[S]hould con-
gress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not 
intrusted to the [national] government it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a 
case requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that such an act was not the law of the land."); 
] A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 452 (1919) (remarks of John Marshall during the 
Virginia ratification debates) ("If ... [Congress] were to make a law not warranted by any of the 
powers enumerated, it would be considered by the [National] judges as an infringement of the Con-
stitution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under their juris-
diction. They would declare it void." (emphasis in original)). 
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
22. But see Vnited States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), which is funda-
mentally subversive of this view. 
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 398 (A. Hamilton) (M. Belolf ed. 1987); see McCulloch, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423 (Marshall, C.J.) (firmly stating Court's obligation to strike down laws not 
authorized by the Constitution). 
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 489 (2d ed. 1836) 
(James Wilson, Pennsylvania adoption debate) ("If a law should be made inconsistent with those 
powers vested by this instrument in Congress, the judges, as a consequence of their independence, 
and the particular powers of government being defined, will declare such law to be null and void 
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B. 
The foregoing introductory review shows very little, I suppose, 
partly because it is introductory, nothing more. Still, I suggest that 
rather than being dismissed with the conventional impatience of the well-
read sophisticate, it implicitly carries a strong set of incidental proposi-
tions with it, including these. 
First, it is the likelihood of continuing differences, rather than the 
unlikelihood of uniformity, that is expected to characterize custom, ac-
tual practice and substantive law from state to state, all without recourse 
to Congress on most matters. Diversity and pluralism are, in short, the 
suppositions (one may say "the very essence") offederalism. They are its 
nature, not its aberration, i.e., not a condition which, when it appears, 
enables Congress to take over the field. To the contrary, the daily fact of 
such differences reports the proof of federalism. In a sense, it is the mea-
sure of the thing itself; and it carries its own kinds of checks. 
So, what a legislature in State A has deemed wrongful in State A, 
one ought expect (rather than be surprised) may not be thought wrongful 
in States B or C: either in 1789 or, despite all our migrations, mobility 
and mass communications, in 1989 as well. So, too, on the great general-
ity of such subjects,25 Congress was meant (and was granted) no author-
ity to flatten things out, either to impose its own preference or to impose 
that common to a majo~ty of the states. 
Merely to take a timely example (in light of a recent Supreme Court 
decision26), sodomy may still be a crime in State A, but not a crime in 
State B-and State C may even have departed so far from the "moral-
ism" (or morality) of State A that within State C discrimination against 
any person based on their private sexual practices is forbidden, rigidly, as 
a matter of law. 
Similarly, State A may put more of its public resources into state or 
locally funded education than either State B or State C. State C may 
provide lower tax rates, a more vigorous private sector and better roads. 
State B may make more expenditures (perhaps because it has more 
money) for running up-to-date courts, although both its roads and its 
schools are inferior to those in States A and C. 
Likewise, in State A the civil rule in negligence cases may continue 
to stress fault as a predicate for reallocating personal losses. In State B, 
however, fault need not be shown if (but only if) the defendant was en-
.... "). For an additional elaboration of the principal point, see Van Alstyne, The Second Death of 
Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1722-33 (1985). 
25. See Madison's observation, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
26. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (upholding Georgia criminal sodomy statute). 
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gaged in a hazardous activity. State A rejects that approach, thinking 
that the degree of hazardousness merely adjusts the standard of care, 
never anything more. State C cares more than either State A or B for 
spreading compensation around, even assuming this may mean fewer 
goods and/or higher prices in some ways, and State C: unlike either State 
A orB, has eliminated contributory negligence by the plaintiff as a bar to 
tort recoveries. 
And so on, and so forth, from subject to subject: e.g., very different 
standards of marriage and divorce, very different laws affecting inheri-
tance and descent,27 very different standards for licensing (or no licens-
ing) as a condition of certain kinds of employment, laws fully protecting 
sexually explicit materials from suppression in some states,28 laws to the 
contrary, from place to place. 
Second, it is a given of federalism that these differences may make 
each state more or less attractive to different people. This merely shows 
again what federalism means; attractiveness is not anything Congress 
may use in order to intervene, standardize or complain of how different 
people respond. Congress has no authority to say that a state failing to 
criminalize sodomy, for instance, is "morally substandard" vis-a-vis 
states that do. Indeed, the power to say which is the more moral position 
27. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819), Marshall adverted to the 
doctrine of legislative pretext; in a follow-up essay, he used the law of descents as an example, i.e., if 
the real object of a federal tax law were to "alter the law of descents" (rather than to raise revenue), 
the Supreme Court would hold it invalid. G. GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 173; see also United 
States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Again, if the real object is to 
accomplish "objects not intrusted to the [National} government," e.g., to alter the law of descents, 
"it would become the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that such an act was not the law of the 
land." McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. The point is both fundamental and not confined. 
Suppose Congress disapproves of the criminal law of State C. or finds unacceptable the wage rates 
State A offers teenage employees in part-time work, or thinks the laws of descent in State B unfair 
(i.e., Congress dislikes whom that law favors although the state Jaw neither denies equal protection 
nor substantive due process by standards set by the fourteenth amendment). May Congress squeeze 
commerce, levy special taxes or spend-with-strings-attached to force a change? If it does, should the 
Court go along? Chief Justice Marshall said that it should not whenever the enumerated power is 
being "fraudulently" used. G. GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 173. In other words, if Congress's 
motive is made clear, the Court is obliged to withhold its assistance rather than go along as an 
accessory-a view that seems eminently correct. 
28. For example, "obscene" materials in Oregon are currently protected from blanket prohibi-
tion under the Oregon state constitution, OR. CaNST. art. I, § 8, though the Supreme Court declines 
to protect them from state and federal regulation under the fourteenth or the first amendments. 
Compare State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 525, 732 P.2d 9, 17 (1987) ("We hold that characterizing 
expression as 'obscenity' under any definition be it Roth, Miller or otherwise, does not deprive it of 
protection under the Oregon Constitution.") with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (reaffirm-
ing that obscenity is not constitutionally protected and establishing guidelines for defining obscenity) 
and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (no first amendment protection from federal regula-
tion of obscene materials) and Alberts v. ,California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (no fourteenth amendment 
protection from state laws regulating sale or advertisement of obscene material). 
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on such matters (criminalizing sodomy or, in contrast, protecting private 
choice of sexual intimacy) was not given to Congress at all. And that is 
precisely the critical point. What constrains the differences among state 
laws on these matters, rather, are constraints of the following sort: 
(a) constitutional constraints imposed upon all states by the Constitu-
tion;29 (b) such separate constraints as may be built into a given state's 
own constitution; and (c) the constraints imposed as an incident of feder-
alism itself, namely that people can and will move, enter, or exit, if suita-
bly attracted or repelled, as each state has reason to bear in mind. 
Consistent with this last check-the "checking effect" of federal-
ism-a state cannot smugly pursue its own agenda as though the state 
existed in a geographic vacuum, or as though the state were hermetically 
sealed at its borders. While it may be master within its own house, it is 
not master over the tenants. Thus, it must measure what it proposes to 
do by its awareness of the presence of coexisting cultures (i.e., other 
states) and its awareness of the extent to which people may move out or 
move in. Federalism checks it in some measure though neither Congress 
nor the fourteenth amendment may do so in the particular circumstance. 
Nor-and here's the point-may Congress intervene to check that check. 
That is the check-that people may vote with their feet, with all that that 
implies. 
We have already noted as an example that in North Carolina sod-
omy may even now be a crime while in California it is not; and that this 
is itself merely an example of federalism, i.e., a matter not given to Con-
gress to trench on but a matter reserved to an expected diversity of treat-
ment state by state.30 Because the United States is not Balkanized by 
Berlin Walls, federalism exerts its own leavening constraint on both 
North Carolina and California. California cannot seal its borders against 
persons so distressed by its outrageous example of "moral depravity" 
that they will give up whatever advantages they enjoy there (a good job, a 
high level of public goods, etc.) and move to North Carolina, taking with 
them whatever skills and personal property they may possess. And vice 
29. E.g., U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 10 (no ex post facto laws, no bills of attainder, no laws impairing 
the obligations of contracts); U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 5 (no laws abridging the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States nor denying equal protection or depriving persons of life, 
liberty or property without due process, with power vested in Congress to "enforce" these fourteenth 
amendment restrictions). Compare Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Acting under its 
section 5 power, Congress may prohibit use of English literacy tests not per se disallowed by the 
fourteenth amendment.) with Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Congress sustained in disal-
lowing 21 year-old voting requirement in respect to federal elections, but held not to have authority 
so to act under se~tion 5 in regard to state or local elections.). 
30. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 (1986) (sustaining sodomy statute 
against fourteenth amendment objections, and noting decriminalization of sodomy in nearly the 
same number of states as those still treating it as a crime). 
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versa, of course, for all who find the moral climate in North Carolina so 
repressive that its other advantages may weigh insufficiently under these 
circumstances. They may prefer the cost of leaving and moving to Cali-
fornia because of the greater sense of personal freedom in matters of sex-
ual practice that state provides. North Carolina cannot bar their exit. 
California cannot intern them or turn them back; in fact, federalism as-
sures all persons of the right to decide for themselves, partly by keeping 
Congress altogether out.31 
Third, this is not a perturbation of federalism, i.e., not an event 
which, by its occurrence, allows Congress to intervene, choose sides on a 
matter not assigned to it, or make law on sodomy. To think so is to 
confuse the assumptions of federalism with a limitation on federalism 
itself, as though federalism "counts" only when it has no material effects. 
Federalism always had material effects, however, which is why some peo-
ple rejoice in it and others-those who long for national majority rule on 
all matters they care about and on which they hope to prevail nation-
ally32-do not. Disliking federalism, disliking also its consequences as it 
constrains their capacity to have their way "cost free" even within the 
state in which they reside, they turn of course to Congress. And so, what 
then? 
In the example just given, it might be that all states except Califor-
nia have the same criminal sodomy law as North Carolina. The opposite 
situation might equally apply: North Carolina alone may have retained 
sodomy as a crime. Either way our illustration works equally well. 
Under either supposition, the internal rule of the one nonconforming 
state (let's make it California) may be otherwise regarded as a national 
outrage. Does it make any difference as to what they (i.e., "the people") 
of the other states may do? I suggest that it does not, and that Congress 
has no power to carry into execution their will to burden California's 
singular choice-a choice that has its own risks33-by the enactment of a 
31. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 10. Compare Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 
(1942) (invalidating North Carolina bigamous cohabitation convictions when state neither chal-
lenged nor rejected Nevada court findings of bonafide domicile as basis for divorce decrees granted 
in that state) with Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (North Carolina court may 
refuse to give full faith and credit to the same Nevada divorce decrees when it explicitly rejects 
Nevada court findings of bona fide domicile in that state). 
32. The point is succinctly stated by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United States, 
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) ("If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain 
result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition."). 
33. For example, that the attraction provided by California's more sexually permissive criminal 
laws may draw to it more new residepts than California would wish to have, or otherwise affect the 
character or indeed the economy of California in ways not entirely welcome (though the state none-
theless prefers to live with those risks rather than avoid them by mimicking what other states do). 
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national antisodomy criminallaw,34 much less by a law forbidding the 
shipment of goods in or out of any state lacking an antisodomy statute. 35 
Similarly, I should think it a joke were the Supreme Court to sustain a 
federal tax in which the tax rate hinged on whether sodomy was a state 
crime and therefore was meant merely to carry into execution the na-
tional passion that sodomy in California must be stamped out. 36 Like-
wise, were Congress to provide that no federal highway assistance (or 
some other form of federal assistance) shall be available in any state or 
local government within a state failing to criminalize sodomy (to keep 
the roads safe from immoral uses?), were the Supreme Court to sustain 
it-well, what would you think about that?37 Should Congress "find" 
34. This should fail on a straightforward application of the enumerated powers doctrine, be-
cause there is no enumerated plenary criminal law power vested in Congress. 
35. This should fail on any serious application of "pretext" doctrine, although it may actually 
not fail given the tendencies of the Court. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) 
(upholding criminalization of movement across state lines incidental to activity Congress regards as 
sexually immoral); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (the Lottery Case) (upholding statute 
interdicting tickets, which Congress disapproves of on moral grounds, whether or not their posses-
sion or use is inoffensive under state Jaw). 
36. See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
("[W]hen oblique use is made of the .taxing power as to matters which substantively are not within 
the powers delegated to Congress, the Court cannot shut its eyes to what is obviously, because 
designedly, an attempt to control conduct which the Constitution left to the responsibility of the 
States, merely because Congress wrapped the legislation in the verbal cellophane of a revenue mea-
sure." (emphasis added)); see also Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98-100 (1969) (Black and 
Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing use of federal tax statute to punish traffic of substances illegal 
under state Jaw); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935) ("[A] penalty ... cannot be 
converted into a tax by so naming it, and we must ascribe to it the character disclosed by its purpose 
and operation, regardless of name." (footnotes omitted)); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66-67 (1922) 
(tax Jaw intended to coerce compliance of state trade boards and their members is both in purpose 
and effect a form of unconstitutional regulation); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 39 
(1922) (the Child Labor Tax Case) (in which even Holmes and Brandeis, dissenters in Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251,277 (1918),joined the opinion invalidating a tax Jaw intended by Congress 
to regulate matters exclusively within state's control). But see United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 
44 (1950) (tax not invalid because it affects activities that Congress might not otherwise regulate); 
United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93 (1919) (announcing reasonable relation test between 
congressional action and congressional power to tax). 
The pretext (or purpose-and-effect) doctrine has been virtually abandoned by the Court on fed-
eralism questions, despite its recognition and use in other areas of constitutional law, e.g., the equal 
protection clause, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976), the establishment clause, Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985), and the attainder clause, United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 
437, 441-49 (1965). 
37. This is a reprise of Holmes' own discredited dictum in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 
155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) ("The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk 
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."). But see Massachusetts v. Mellon, 
262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923) ("[T]he powers of the State are not invaded, since the statute imposes no 
obligation but simply extends an option which the State is free to accept or reject."). 
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985), the majority lamely 
suggests that notwithstanding its decision in that case there may be some state prerogatives beyond 
congressional direction, such as the selection of a state capitol site. There are two noteworthy fea-
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that people in California lacked equal protection from sodomy (thereby 
justifying the federal criminalization of such an offense) and should the 
Supreme Court sustain the act of Congress on that ground,38 we would 
likewise know that federalism is dead. 
Suppose in addition that while some people in states other than Cali-
fornia may want to go to California because of its unique freedom, others 
find it intolerable twice over: (a) they find intolerable the fact that Cali-
fornia permits private acts of sodomy (they regard it as clearly morally 
"substandard"); and (b) they find intolerable the marginal threat upon 
their own moral preferences posed by the possibility that some of their 
own residents, drawn by California's distinctive freedom,39 will pick up 
and leave, and take their productive skills with them. From their per-
spective, not only is California acting unacceptably by declining to recog-
nize minimum standards of common sexual decency (namely their own) 
Qut worse, California may even tend to prosper economically as a conse-
quence, and at their expense (unless they change their laws which they 
fiercely do not want to do), as an incident of its perverse attractiveness to 
people suddenly California-bound. At least now may Congress 
intervene?40 
tures of this example. First, note the significant triviality of this limit on congressional power. Sec-
ond, even this restriction may amount to nothing, given the Court's position on the spending power 
and federalism, i.e., spending with strings attached. To paraphrase Massachusetts v. Mellon, the 
power of the state to determine the location of its own capitol is not invaded, since the statute, 
conditioning the availability of federal assistance, imposes no obligation but simply extends an op-
tion which the state is free to accept or reject. Alternatively, to revert to McAuliffe, the state may 
have a right to determine where its s~t of government shall be located, but it has no right to federal 
funds. The Court's most recent review of this matter leaves the door only slightly ajar. See South 
Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987) (7-2 decision) (sustaining statute withholding federal high-
way assistance to any state failing to criminalize purchase or possession of liquor by all persons 
under 21, despite scope of federal requirement). 
38. The appropriate theory of Congress would be that each state has a duty not to deny persons 
within its jurisdiction that same protection (from sodomy) as others in every other state already 
receive. Bold, and incorrect, is it not? 
Note also how such an "interpretation" of the equal protection clause by Congress would work 
in the exact opposite case, that is, in the case where sodomy is a crime only in North Carolina and 
not a crime in any other state, and Congress is "morally outraged" with the North Carolina (rather 
than with the California) rule. Congress could find that persons in North Carolina are not equally 
protected in their rights of intimate private conduct as those in other states are protected, and de-
clare the North Carolina statute void pursuant to section 5 6f the fourteenth amendment. lf one 
pays no attention to any federalism principles, both of these approaches may work. 
39. "Freedom" from one point of view, but "decadence" from the point of view of majorities in 
all the other states. 
40. I trust the point of the example is plain, namely, that an enormous amount of question-
begging analysis has been expended upon demonstrating how Congress must be able to intervene, in 
order to head off the so-called "race to the bottom." Given the mobility of capital and labor, so this 
claim holds, the "lowest" standard~ will tend to control unless Congress intervenes. But whose 
policy is "low" and whose is "high" depends wholly on one's point of view, as this example is meant 
to suggest. Principles of federalism recognize the subtlety. Moral totalitarians do not. 
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I should think it clear that Congress may do nothing of the sort-
nothing has occurred sufficient to grant Congress a national veto, pursu-
ant to any power it is assigned. The situation presented here is in no way 
distinguishable from the most commonplace consequences of everyday 
federalism in 1789. Indeed, it is exactly the same. Then, as now, differ-
ences in legal cultures among the states affected different people differ-
ently; the most minuscule differences in state laws-as well as the more 
significant differences-have always had constraining interstate effects. 
Federalism takes those effects for granted; indeed, it may be said that 
federalism depends on them for its own checks and balances. That they 
"actually" materialize changes nothing. Rather, they are suppositions of 
federalism, i.e., they go with the territory. The contemplation of those 
effects (on the loss side) may well constrain the degree of "reform" a 
zealous state legislature might otherwise adopt, by putting it on notice 
that it cannot seal its borders against those who may leave or call Con-
gress to its aid to impose its own domestic preference on other states and 
thus nullify the contrast they provide. Federalism likewise stimulates re-
form (and puts status quo states to their own test) by making clear that 
neither can other states move through Congress to cut off that one re-
form-minded legislature. Federalism leavens and enlivens, whereas the 
"trump" of Congress flattens out. My point, then, is the rudimentary 
one. On virtually all of the subjects we have very briefly touched on, 
Congress was given no trump to play. 
Finally, I have chosen this example carefully, thinking that, by mak-
ing California the experimental (and less criminally repressive) state, and 
by assigning to it the substantive rule that strikes me as that which is 
frankly the better rule-such that the reader will want to be skeptical of 
finding power in Congress to destroy it or effectively make it of no conse-
quence-one may see the federalism value of our Constitution sympa-
thetically even as I do. But I do not want to beg any questions in having 
proceeded in this manner, nor do I care to trade on today's ideological 
fashions, for the larger point is too important to be misrepresented in this 
way. Thus, supposing morality were reversed, and all states save North 
Carolina repealed their antisodomy statutes and then became (a) morally 
enraged because North Carolina's "regressive" exceptionality seemed 
unendurably repressive (to them), and (b) economically alarmed because 
North Carolina was actually attracting (rather than repelling) people and 
skills and talent because of its stubborn difference from the rest, the point 
would be the same. Congress could not constitutionally intervene until 
such time as an amendment was secured through the requirements of 
article V, empowering Congress to do so pursuant to that change. Such 
an amendment-such a federal rearrangement-though perhaps desira-
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ble to some (not including myself), is currently not an available option. I 
have tried only to show that there is some better explanation due from 
those who think an amendment unnecessary than the sort of explanation 
we have generally had. 
All laws affect commerce in one way or another. Most laws affect 
commerce among the states, just as they always have and in some mea-
sure always must. Notwithstanding conventional wisdom to the con-
trary, however, Congress was granted no power to regulate "whatever 
affects" the movement of people or their goods across state lines--doubt-
less in ready recognition of what such a (wholly fanciful) grant of power 
would have implied. Indeed, it is a reasonably safe guess that had any 
enumerated power been proposed in such terms, the Constitution pro-
posing it would have been rebuffed. And similarly, to construe any 
power as though it were this one, is a facetious judicial act. 
It was Holmes, one of our most nationalist judges,41 and not 
Peckham or Sutherland (two of the more "conservative" judges), who 
pungently observed: "Commerce depends upon population, but Con-
gress could not, on that ground, undertake to regulate marriage and di-
vorce."42 And why is that'! It cannot be because differences among state 
laws of marriage and divorce cannot "affect commerce." They obviously 
do (even as Holmes is quick to say), yet this fact gives Congress no au-
41. See, for example, his opinion for the Court in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 
(1920) (Congressional act protecting endangered birds pursuant to international treaty upheld over 
tenth amendment objections). See also his dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 278-81 
(Congress may use commerce clause to regulate intrastate economic activities affecting interstate 
commerce). 
42. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 402 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For 
his discussion of legislative pretext, see id. at 411. Note that some of the strongest statements of 
disagreement against the centripetal claims of Congress to superimpose regimes of national Jaw 
through the cellophane wrappers of enumerated powers have in fact come from judges not easily 
dismissed as "soft" on states' rights. See United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2108 n.4 (1987) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (The federal government Jacks constitutional authority to authorize federal 
detention of persons whose predicted future conduct would not violate federal law.); Perez v. United 
States, 402 U.S. 146, 158 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Because I am unable to discern any 
rational distinction between Joan sharking and other local crime, I cannot escape the conclusion that 
this statute was beyond the power of Congress to enact."); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 
(I 968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The Court must draw the 'constitutional line between the State as 
government and the State as trader •.. .'"(quoting New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579 
(1946) (Frankfurter, J.))), overruled in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), 
overruled i11turn by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (I 985); see, e.g., Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Opposing as unconstitutional 
federal anti-obscenity statute nominally adopted under the postal power: "[T]he interests which 
obscenity statutes purportedly protect are primarily entrusted to the care, not of the Federal Govern-
ment, but of the States.''); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22,40 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) ("Congress ... cannot constitutionally grapple directly with gambling in the States [and] 
compel self-incriminating disclosures for the enforcement of State gambling laws, merely because it 
does so under the guise of a revenue measure obviously passed not for revenue purposes.''). 
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thority to intervene and set a national norm;43 the case is the same as in 
Marshall's example respecting differences in state laws of descent,44 a 
subject similarly not given to Congress to preempt or control.45 It should 
also follow that even if in strict form a regulation adopted by Congress 
were limited to commerce among the states, it would nonetheless be con-
stitutionally objectionable on federalism grounds if in fact it were but the 
means Congress seized hold of in behalf of the same unauthorized end, 
e.g., to drive out marriages and divorces not comporting with the prevail-
ing congressional taste, despite their compliance with valid (though dif-
fering) state laws. 
II. AT LARGE IN THE CELLOPHANE SEA 
Suppose an act of Congress (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was 
candidly framed as follows: 
42 U.S.C. § 4327. The Commerce Clause Regulation of Marital Stan-
dards Act. 
"AN ACT THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO PREEMPT STATE LAWS 
OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE BY RENDERING OF NO FORCE AND EF-
FECT ANY STATE LAW REsPECTING MARRIAGE OR DIVORCE MORE 
PERMISSIVE THAN THIS CONGRESS ALONE CONSIDERS MORAL." 
§ 1. Definitions: "Proper" marriages within the meaning of this Act 
are marriages satisfying the following terms: 
(a) Marriage between persons both of whom are at least 21 years 
of age; 
(b) Marriage between persons if but only if (etc.) .... 
§ 2. Definitions: "Improper" divorces within the meaning of this act 
are divorces of the following kinds: 
(a) Divorce on any grounds other than adultery, desertion or 
extreme mental cruelty; 
(b) Divorce when (etc.) .... 
§ 3. Operative Provisions: 
43. See also D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM 28-29, 122 (1987) (Emphasizing 
the pointlessness of positing a power in Congress to regulate whatever affects commerce since no 
such power is-or ever was-vested in Congress; the power is merely to regulate that which is 
"commerce" and then only insofar as it is commerce with foreign nations or among the several 
states.). 
44. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 173. 
45. In an important way, the enactment of the fourteenth amendment (with its express invest-
ment of congressional enforcement power in section 5) italicizes the point stressed in the text. To the 
extent that certain kinds of state laws are felt to be intolerable to essential concepts of basic fairness, 
they are forbidden by the fourteenth amendment-and Congress is given express power to enforce 
the limits against every state. To the extent that they are not thus forbidden, there is no Catch-22 
lurking in article I, i.e., no smuggled-in means by which intolerant national majorities may punish 
nonconformist polities that nonetheless have done nothing to offend the provisions in the fourteenth 
amendment, article I, section 10, or any other affirmative restrictions elsewhere laid down. 
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(a) All persons, partnerships, corporations or other entities or 
associations engaged in commerce shall require of all employees signed 
affidavits indicating whether such marriage they have is "proper" ac-
cording to § I, and whether such divorce they may have had is not 
"improper" according to § 2; 
(b) No person, partnership, corporation or other entity or asso-
ciation subject to § 3(a) shall put into interstate commerce any goods 
or services unless the affidavits it has on file confirm that, of those 
among its employees who are married, all have "proper" marriages 
according to § 1, and that of those among its employees who are di-
vorced, none have "improper" divorces according to § 2. 
§ 4. Sanctions: Any person, partnership, corporation or other entity or 
association acting in violation of § 3 shall be subject to imprisonment 
for not less than one year nor more than ten years, a fine of not less 
than $10,000 nor more than $500,000, or both. 
§ 5. Interpretive Guide: In any case arising under this Act wherein is 
drawn in question the scope, meaning or proper application of this 
Act, this Act shall be construed in whatever manner as is most likely 
to accomplish the objective declared in its preamble. 
One needs to take a careful look at this mock act of Congress. It 
will provide a key as one moves to a description of the constitutional 
status of federalism today, for the manner in which one sees it rightly 
adjudicated in the Supreme Court will provide at least one insight re-
specting a large series of federalism issues as they have actually tended to 
be resolved. We have come to the proverbial fork in the road. 
The first point to note is the claim of entitlement made by Congress 
respecting what it seeks to do; namely, that it is entitled to set the terms 
of marriage and divorce for all persons who need or desire certain kinds 
of work. The bill also leaves no doubt of the matter by the forcefulness 
of its preambular declaration, its choice of descriptive terms (e.g., 
"proper" marriages, "improper" divorces), and the concluding section as 
well. It makes a claim of Congress's view of its power to act. It inter-
prets article I, section 8 of the Constitution in the following way: 
Congress shall have power to regulate marriage and divorce for all 
people who need or desire work in firms that provide goods or services 
for people in other states. 
It is this power Congress has exercised or, rather, this power Congress 
has claimed. 
One way of responding to this claim is to take it at face value and 
reject it quite effortlessly on the following federalism grounds. "Congress 
is given no power to prescribe the terms of marriage and of divorce," 
such an opinion might begin, "either generally or for any particular 
class." "To sustain this Act," the opinion might then say, 
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we would not need to concede the whole power-which no one includ-
ing Congress now claims for Congress-but we would need to concede 
an arbitrary part of it, which we are quite unwilling to do. 
Prescribing the terms of marriage and divorce for those engaged 
by firms in commerce is nowhere among any of the enumerated powers 
granted to Congress. As an interpretative explication of legislative ju-
risdiction apportioned by the Constitution between that which is dele-
gated to Congress and that reserved from its control, moreover, the 
Act frankly makes no sense at all. The Constitution does not appor-
tion legislative jurisdiction this way. We see nothing in the enumer-
ated powers provided in article I or elsewhere that grants Congress 
more power to hem in one's freedom to marry or divorce by the chance 
circumstance of working for General Motors rather than for the local 
grocer or, indeed, not working at all. 
Tying the employment eligibility of persons to work for certain 
firms by a requirement that they forego marriages or divorces Congress 
disapproves, presumes to locate in Congress a decisional power of mar-
riage and divorce the people reserved to themselves, a power reserved 
to them subject only to such standards they need satisfy under some 
set of relevant state law that must itself satisfy the fourteenth amend-
ment, which Congress does not here even purport to enforce. The Act 
imposes an unauthorized and thus unconstitutional condition on all 
such persons by declaring them ineligible for a large category of jobs 
unless they yield to Congress's preference as to what constitutes a 
"proper" marriage and a "proper" divorce. We hold that it need not 
be met. No useful distinction exists in this regard whether one holds a 
job at General Motors or a local store vending homeopathic remedies 
made wholly from backyard herbs. Congress is given no power on 
either account to require one to yield to Congress the grounds of di-
vorce or the age one is eligible to marry. 
Moreover, the Act is very plain as well as forceful in acknowledg-
ing whom it means to regulate and why. It is not any business practice 
of the firm that Congress is concerned with; it is, rather, the marriage 
and divorce choices of those who seek work there over whom Congress 
means to exert effective control. Their relation to the firm engaged in 
commerce is but the attempted means. As we hold that Congress has 
no power so to regulate them, we hold also that no firm may be penal-
ized for any failure to accede to the congressional demand that it police 
marriages and divorces according to Congress's wi11.46 
785 
While I think this outcome correct, arguably it is not-not according to 
conventional doctrine that governs a great deal of judicial review today. 
On its face,47 the Act frames rules applicable exclusively to conven-
tional business enterprises and not to their employees. Moreover, it 
46. Needless to say, a state law forbidding employment discrimination by any firm discharging 
or refusing to hire any person on grounds of not being "properly" married or on grounds of being 
"improperly" divorced would be as valid and as enforceable as any other conventional state civil 
rights law. The employer would have no defense that it was merely complying with federal law. 
47. See the Act, § 3(a), (b). 
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presumes to instruct the finns to which it applies solely in respect to their 
employment policies and not otherwise. Even then, so long as they en-
gage only in local (i.e., intrastate) commerce, they are largely exempt 
from the Act. The conditions of the Act the affected firms need satisfy 
are effectively applicable only if the firms wish to participate in "com-
merce among the several states," and not otherwise.48 The Act does not 
even regulate their employment practices directly, i.e., it does not di-
rectly command them whom to employ or not employ; rather, "all" the 
Act does is to declare what commercial goods and services may and may 
not be traded across state lines, nothing more.49 Because the law is no 
more than a rule prescribing what may and may not seek a commercial 
outlet outside a given state, it seems squarely to be within the enumer-
ated power delegated to Congress. The power to "regulate," it may be 
said, is the power to provide the rule by which such commerce as is sub-
ject to congressional will shall be governed, and that is all that is involved 
in this Act and in this case. (There is no requirement, it will be said, that 
the rule Congress adopts must facilitate, rather than bar, particular com-
merce; neither is it objectionable because Congress disapproves the em-
ployment practice of the producer, rather than the particular goods or 
services as such. The cases are virtually legion on that point.) 
It may be true that the Act is meant to discourage people from act-
ing on the degree of freedom permitted them under some state laws (the 
preamble so declares) but so what of that? That tends to be true in many 
cases that have been before the Court, e.g., regulations of minimum em-
ployable age where the minimum is similarly higher (as the marriage age 
set by this Act) than a state regards as quite sufficient for a person to 
decide such matters for herself but where Congress has thought it better 
to require such persons to wait-and bans from interstate commerce the 
goods of any firm unwilling to require her to wait. In all such cases, it is 
48. This is not true of section 3(a) because the Act requires compliance with section 3(a) with-
out regard to whether the particular business entity engages in any interstate commerce, but if sec-
tion 3(b) is valid (under the commerce clause), it is easy to see section 3(a) as valid within a 
conventionally generous construction of the necessary and proper clause, i.e., as a means of ensuring 
the compliance integrity of section 3(b). Indeed, if section 3(b) is valid, the necessary and proper 
clause will-under existing case law-at once enable Congress to extend section 3(b) itself to any 
entity doing strictly intrastate business in order that those furnishing competitive services and goods 
interstate not be threatened by the "unfair" exemption of local sellers of goods and services from 
federal business regulations already imposed by Congress. This has been the usual manner in which 
similar acts of Congress are enlarged in installments, gradually extending "wall to wall," to persons 
and activities not ever engaged in interstate commerce. Accordingly, in two steps or three steps at 
most, fulfillment of the candid congressional avowal (stated in the preamble of the Act) will be 
complete if the Act is itself upheld. 
49. The Act is modeled from Champion v. Ames (the Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) and 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
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plain that Congress does not want the state's view of the matter to be 
controlling or to be relied upon by the employer or the employee. So 
Congress discourages people from doing what they are "free" to do 
under state law, by confining their employment opportunities to busi-
nesses not engaged in interstate commerce. Of course, Congress has not 
presumed to regulate marriage and divorce directly (the state law still 
controls as to that). Q.E.D., this law can be easily sustained. 
Note that if this Act is sustained in these circumstances, much nec-
essarily follows from that course. 50 It will be a matter of indifference that 
the Act does not facilitate (rather, it bars) commerce among the states. 5 1 
It will be of no significance, either, that the act of Congress has no pur-
pose simply and sensibly to dislodge commercially discriminatory or pro-
tectionist local legislation52 (rather it enacts discriminatory legislation), 
or to put an end to private monopoly or oligopoly shielded by captive (or 
indifferent) state law. 53 Neither will it matter that the legislation at hand 
is not addressed to stabilizing collapsed national or international mar-
kets, 54 i.e., in no way does it purport to address economic conditions 
beyond the means of state legislatures to do much about if left alone to 
confront them. Nor will it matter that it is plainly not an exercise in 
cooperative federalism, i.e., an act of Congress the operation of which is 
contingent upon state law,55 helpful to each alike according to its terms. 
In respect to each of these kinds of acts of Congress, and possibly in 
respect to some other kinds as well, a power to "regulate commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States"56 is both coherent and 
consistent with federalism (indeed, one may say that this is the nature of 
the affirmative power actually granted). What is not sensible, however, is 
50. Including, not trivially, the creation of the means to extend the Act to businesses not en-
gaged in interstate commerce, under the necessary and proper clause (as discussed supra note 48). 
Cf Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985) ("[I]t long has been 
settled that Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause extends to intrastate economic activi-
ties that affect interstate commerce."). 
51. Cf Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824) (preempting state act authorizing com-
mercial navigational monopoly license under federal coastal licensing act providing for freer trade). 
52. Cf Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875) (applying "negative voice" of commerce clause 
to a plainly discriminatory state tax on goods originating out of state). 
53. Cf Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (antitrust legislation regulating intrastate activ-
ity having impact on interstate commerce held constitutional); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 
375 (1905) (sustaining Sherman Act injunction against price fixing scheme by meat dealers based on 
"practical" observation that some local activities are an integral part of the "current of commerce"). 
54. Cf Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill, 115-17 (1942) (sustaining a far-reaching act of Con-
gress nonetheless addressed to this very issue). 
55. For example, an act of Congress making it a federal crime to remove a stolen car across 
state lines, in which the definition of "stolen" is tied to the theft Jaw vel non of the state from which 
the car is being taken. 
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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to read it as a power that provides: "Congress shall have power to em-
bargo the movement of goods and services from state to state to effectu-
ate whatever policies as it likes and according to such terms as it 
decrees. "57 
III. NAVIGATING THE CELLOPHANE SEA 
As already suggested,58 if the Act examined in the preceding section 
were sustained (and it is easy to see that it might), under existing case law 
it is clear that Congress may also extend it to provide: 
No person, partnership, corporation or other entity or association shall 
produce any goods or services which compete within any state with 
such goods and services as are produced by entities themselves subject 
to section 3(b) of 42 U.S.C. § 4327, without themselves complying 
\vith sections 3(a) and 3(b) of 42 U.S.C. § 4327. 
The measure is readily sustainable on the following rationale. Without 
it, local competitors might be thought to benefit from an unfair advan-
tage over their interstate rivals who already must comply with the origi-
nal Act. Thus, in order that the efficacy of the original Act not be put at 
risk, all firms competing in respect to similar goods and services should 
be made to play by the same rules in terms of whom they may and may 
not employ. The enumerated power in Congress to do so is the enumer-
57. But see D. ENGDAHL, supra note 43, at 53, 60 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in 
original): 
The Constitution places no limit whatever on the ends Congress may use its enumerated 
powers as a means to attain. • • • Exclusions from interstate commerce ... are the simplest 
illustration of this principle at work. Other illustrations include conditioning federal 
grants, contracts, or permits, or exemptions from federal taxes, upon the recipients' com-
pliance with stipulations which Congress otherwise Jacks power to enforce. The require-
ments thus attached as conditions need not bear a telic relation to any matter of legitimate 
federal concern. 
D. ENGDAHL, supra note 43, at 53, 60 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original). Professor 
Engdahl's analysis would require the courts to sustain the hypothetical Act discussed in this essay. 
He regards Marshall's own statements on limited proper objectives-the pretext doctrine-as "un-
founded," as "error," and as "mischievous." I d. at 52-53. I believe Engdahl may be fundamentally 
in error. Cf. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) ("We do not say 
that a tax is valid, when imposed by act of Congress, if it is laid upon the condition that a state may 
escape its operation through the adoption of a statute unrelated in subject matter to activities fairly 
within the scope of national policy and power."). Compare L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 3Jl-12 (2d ed. 1988) ("[I]t is now settled that Congress may impose whatever conditions it 
wishes, so long as the conditions themselves violate no independent constitutional prohibition, on the 
privilege of producing for, serving customers in, or othenvise 'sitting astride the channels of,' inter-
state commerce." (emphasis in original)) with id. at 400 ("If tacit postulates of federalism are indeed 
ingrained in the Constitution, courts are not free to dismiss them out of hand as ghosts or spirits in 
which no one any longer believes." (emphasis added)). See also A. VAN ALSTYNE, K. KAr.ST & J. 
GERARD, SUM & SUBSTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 57 (4th ed. 1986) (suggesting that a broad 
construction of each enumerated congressional power is warranted only "for accomplishing legiti-
mate objectives for which the power was delegated"). 
58. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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ated power of the "necessary and proper" clause; 59 though the amended 
Act reaches some firms not in interstate commerce, it is Congress's not 
unreasonable view that their inclusion is necessary and proper in order to 
avoid the practical frustration of the original Act. 60 Since the "integrity" 
of the federal regulation might be threatened unless the Act is made em-
bracing, its extension to purely local producers is secure, Correspond-
ingly (and here's the point of course), the real purpose and intended 
effect of the original Act itself-to disallow marriages and divorces not 
congenial to the congressionally prescribed standards-will be very 
greatly extended as well. Nor are we nearly done. 
Indeed, under prevailing precedent,61 if the original Act and the 
proposed enlargement just described are both valid, then the Act may 
also be extended to apply to states as employers and to all of their polit-
ical subdivisions as employers such that the original object, announced in 
the original preamble, will be fulfilled completely: no work or job for 
anyone not marrying or divorcing by the congressionally approved stan-
dards can lawfully be provided in the United States. The key, then, must 
lie within the original case. Decide that case wrongly and all else tends 
to follow inexorably, quite as a matter of course. Hold against that Act, 
on the other hand, and all else holds firm as well-the enlargements have 
nothing to tie onto for support. 
In fact, as matters now stand under existing case law, either out-
come in the original case readily can be reached, as I am confident any 
reasonably well-informed reader will know. Interestingly, on the other 
hand, one may nonetheless think that if the final form of the Act-the 
form forbidding any employment of any person marrying under the age 
of twenty-one or divorcing on grounds other than those approved by 
Congress-had itself constituted the original Act adopted by Congress, 
so enormous a claim by Congress-to control marriage and divorce-
might not be sustained by a majority of the Court even today. If that is 
so, however, it is not merely curious-i.e., strange-that matters should 
work in this fashion. It should serve to reinforce the point just made: 
the first case is in fact the critical case to work on. That case does pose 
the greater intellectual challenge despite its less extreme reach. As we 
just noted, the subsequent enlargements have nothing sufficient to tie 
onto (whether pursuant to the commerce clause or pursuant to the neces-
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
60. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941) ("Congress, having ... adopted the 
policy of excluding from interstate commerce all goods ... which do not conform to the specified 
labor standards, ... may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted 
end, even though they involve control of intrastate activities."). 
61. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-57 (1985). 
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sary and proper clause) if the original Act is not upheld. Uphold the 
original Act, however, and there is no strong break off point for propos-
ing an adequate constitutional distinction down to and including the final 
form. The reason is that, all other considerations aside, in sustaining the 
original Act the Court will already have conceded to Congress the power 
over marriage and divorce through the terms or" employment by inter-
state firms. Having done so, it lacks any "bright line" basis for constitu-
tional objection against the successive measures Congress puts down in 
its (inevitable) mosaic of extensions. If this is so, then it ought make 
little difference whether Congress proceeds in installments, or whether it 
clips off the larger field in a single, massive stroke. 
Some readers might be tempted to finesse the federalism question if 
the final form were itself the original form of the Act, by holding the Act 
unconstitutional-but on different grounds than "mere" lack of enumer-
ated power. Rather, they might at once leap over that question in favor 
of landing on a provision in the Bill of Rights. I, too, have considered 
that temptation, but I thinl~ it is even more useful to consider because of 
the very strong light it also sheds on the original federalism question as 
well. To be less obscure about the matter, here is what I have in mind. 
If the proposed final form of the Act (the wall-to-wall form) were 
just boldly thrown down by Congress in the first place, I believe many 
would at once see a different sort of arguable constitutional defect in the 
Act: a denial of fifth amendment equal protection of the laws. 62 
Looking at the proposed, full congressional regulation in terms of 
equal protection, one at once may see that Congress made what may 
readily strike one as an unfair classification: as between those who need 
to work and those who need not. First, we note, Congress has not pre-
sumed to forbid all persons under twenty-one to marry, 63 nor has it for-
bidden anyone to seek a divorce other than on the three stated grounds. 64 
Rather, whether such marriages and divorces lawfully occur will still be 
a function of state law. All such marriages and divorces as are permitted 
in many states continue to be valid and recognized. In practice, nonethe-
less, Congress has put such marriages out of reach only for persons under 
twenty-one who cannot forego the necessity to work. That, moreover, 
was exactly its expected impact: to deny them any employment opportu-
62. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (finding equal protection component in due 
process clause of fifth amendment). 
63. I.e., it has not made such "marriages" (as defined and allowed under the otherwise control-
ling applicable state law) a federal ofiense on the grounds that it regards such marriages as impru-
dently entered into. 
64. One reason it has not done so may be the obvious federalism objection to such a law, which 
does not presume to regulate commerce at all, let alone commerce among the several states. 
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nity if (but only if) they presume to marry contrary to congressional 
will-and so, too, in respect to the "divorce penalty" aspect of the bill. 
Second, by thus effectively reserving only to the more affiuent co-
horts of American sixteen to twenty-one year olds such legal marriage 
eligibility as is more generously furnished by state law in many states, 
Congress has simply wiped out marriage (and certain divorce options) 
solely for the "working" class. A strongly based, fifth amendment equal 
protection objection virtually suggests itself. The law discriminates 
against the less well-to-do, solely according to their need to work, in re-
spect to a matter of no less legitimacy (marriage and divorce) for them 
than for others not similarly affected by this law, namely, the well-to-
do.65 Q.E.D., this act of Congress is unconstitutional on fifth amend-
ment grounds. 
The preceding analysis is tempting, but I think it has a link with the 
federalism question with which we have been concerned. My point is by 
this means ultimately to get back to the federalism analysis itself, where 
the more interesting work remains to be done. Here is why I think the 
two are linked. 
Unless Congress has the constitutionally delegated authority to set a 
uniform national age for marriage eligibility as such (as I do not under-
stand anyone claims to be the case in the first instance), it is a bit awk-
ward to fault Congress for what it did. It. does not have the same 
legislative power to reach persons not related to interstate commerce as it 
does with respect to those "involved" in that commerce. It has reached 
all whom it can reach by that power, and it has reached all of them in 
exactly the same way, i.e., in the only way it can. 
A state, for instance, has an obligation of equal protection only to 
persons "within its jurisdiction," i.e., in respect to those within its legisla-
tive authority to command. That it does not try to extend its legislation 
to persons not within its legislative authority cannot be used by those 
subject to its jurisdiction to complain. The appropriate field of equal pro-
tection comparison, in short, is never larger than the field within the leg-
islative jurisdiction of the state in question. The same proposition applies 
in respect to Congress. It is simply irrelevant, therefore, that those 
outside Congress's control are not regulated in the same way when all 
those within its control are all being treated alike. No equal protection 
objection can be structured on such a ground. 
65. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating Wisconsin statute requiring state 
resident to prove ability to continue court-ordered child support payments in order to receive court 
permission to remarry). 
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Actually, however, the fifth amendment equal protection perspec-
tive we have been using here turns out to illuminate the original federal-
ism (power in Congress) question as well. For in all of the several 
preceding paragraphs, notice the characterization of the subject of the 
Act employed to describe the equal protection claim; insofar as it was 
successful in identifying the subject for purposes of equal protection anal-
ysis, it is successful because it describes that subject in the same way as 
the first opinion66 (holding the act unconstitutional on federalism 
grounds), i.e., as a "regulation of marriage and of divorce." It did not 
use the different characterization seized upon by the second opinion, i.e., 
as (merely) a "regulation of what kind of goods or services are eligible in 
interstate trade." 
Our fifth amendment equal protection argument barged right in by 
noticing how unequally Congress is treating persons in respect to mar-
riage and divorce. The first opinion similarly "barged right in" by notic-
ing the same thing, albeit for federalism review purposes. The Act, the 
equal protection argument observed, affects most persons but not all per-
sons over sixteen and under twenty-one. It cuts off from marriage only 
those, but indeed all of those who, though eligible to marry by state law, 
will need to work before turning twenty-one. It likewise affects most 
persons but not all persons in the freedom to divorce. Those plainly un-
affected are those and only those who (a) do not anticipate the need to 
work, and who (b) establish residence in a state whose domestic relations 
law permits divorce whether or not there is evidence of adultery, deser-
tion or extreme mental cruelty. But as such, it is a rather weak argument 
because those that slip by the regulation of Congress are merely those 
who, by stipulation, Congress is not authorized to reach. The federalism 
argument is, in fact, the better one. It went more directly to the point; it 
questioned the authority in Congress to reach those whom it presumed to 
reach in the manner it did. It did not bail them out by merely faulting 
Congress for failing to reach others as well. 
On the other hand, if one characterized the act of Congress differ-
ently, as "merely" an act determining the eligibility for certain goods or 
services to move in interstate commerce-and not as a regulation of mar-
riage or divorce at all-there is hardly any more of an equal protection 
issue left, any more than there was a federalism issue. All those subject 
to Congress's power-namely, similarly situated firms, those sending 
goods and services across state lines-are treated identically; all must 
comply with the same standards. That Congress does not regulate those 
who are not employers is irrelevant. That Congress does not presume to 
66. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
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regulate employers not engaged in interstate commerce, it may similarly 
be said, does not deny equal protection to those who are engaged in inter-
state commerce. That is just how the alternative opinion (sustaining the 
Act) chose to describe the situation in the manner of characterizing the 
Act. 
The original problem was also "actually" the same problem of cor-
rect characterization of the Act for purposes of constitutional review. 
Where one goes in will measure how one is bound to come out, whether 
one frames it as an enumerated power question, or as a fifth amendment 
question. Moreover, I shall insist that it is a problem compelled by the 
doctrine of enumerated powers (delimited, delegated affirmative powers 
plus the tenth amendment), and not one we have imagined or contrived. 
Examine once again the act of Congress presented in Part II. If 
asked to answer the following question, what answer are you inclined to 
provide? (Note how entirely different answers were implicit in the two 
rival approaches reflected in the earlier discussion of the Supreme 
Court's treatment, pursuant to the first of which the Act is held invalid 
and pursuant to the second of which it would be sustained. Which did 
you think more nearly correct?) Here is that question: 
Is this Act a regulation of marriage and divorce or is it a regulation of 
commerce among the several states? 
"Obviously it is at least nominally a regulation of commerce among 
the several states," one is inclined to say. "Obviously it is also a regula-
tion of marriage and divorce of sorts (albeit admittedly of an odd, non-
standard sort)," one quickly adds. "Obviously, too, Congress does think 
certain kinds of marriage and certain grounds for divorce are more ap-
propriate than other kinds and other grounds (for it so declared), and 
Congress obviously means to stop those it deems to be in the latter cate-
gory so far as it believes it has the power to de so. All this is clear. So, 
what's the point?" 
In thus answering, one declines to take the question as put. Rather, 
one denies its "either/or" dichotomy (i.e., the act of Congress is "either" 
the one thing-which Congress is plainly given power to regulate-"or" 
that it is another thing-which Congress was not given power to deter-
mine). But is the question just an instance of putting a question contain-
ing a logical fallacy? For constitutional purposes I think not. Indeed, it 
is a question never regarded as contrived in other areas of constitutional 
law. Rather, choosing one or the other kind of characterization, to pre-
vent unconstitutional fraud, is regarded as the most critical task of the 
judiciary. 
Here is a familiar example from a neighboring clause affecting feder-
alism: Was the thing enacted by Congress and held invalid in Bailey v. 
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Drexel Furniture Co. 67 (in which Holmes concurred) a "tax" or was it a 
"regulation"? Note, again, we treat it as though it cannot be both. But it 
too, you surely should declare, was both one and the other: an exercise 
of one enumerated power as well as a nonstandard example of another 
kind of power-one not given to Congress. Quite right, yet consider how 
the Court answered the question in Bailey itself. They did not answer it 
as you have just done. They actually presumed to say it was not a "tax," 
but a "regulation," and then held it unconstitutional. How odd, for 
without benefit of the opinion-and without the conditioning of one's 
thinking the case itself provided-! doubt whether one would agree. Or 
at least one would say that the question as "answered" in Bailey was 
treated in the same "either/or" (but not both) fashion as I pressed you to 
do for the question we just now laid aside. 
The act in question in Bailey was in form an excise tax: a fiscal levy, 
payable into the national treasury, incidental to a particular activity inso-
far as one partook of that activity and not otherwise. In that sense it was_ 
clearly a "tax." If one still insists otherwise, I respectfully suggest some 
wriggling on one's own part, i.e., one's insistence in describing it as not a 
"tax" (or not a "true tax," or "not merely a tax") makes an appeal that 
may be appropriate but requires some explaining along the way. This, of 
course, is just what the Supreme Court itself did, is it not? 
What did the Court do in Bailey, in so characterizing the statute in 
question-as indeed it characterized it not as a "tax" -and how might a 
like inquiry be pertinent in our original case as well? Among such addi-
tional observations made by the Court in Bailey were observations such 
as these (why, if at all, did it think them germane?): what effect(s) was 
the thing-called-a-tax-by-Congress (and on its face indeed a tax) most 
likely to have, and what effects was it obviously meant to have? Was it 
clear, under the circumstances, that Congress would in fact be more dis-
appointed were anyone to pay it rather than saving the expense by alto-
gether shifting out of the activity to which the tax was attached? If so, 
why should it matter? What does it matter why the tax was imposed? 
Does anything tum on this? Holmes thought so, 68 Frankfurter thought 
so, 69 even now the conventional wisdom says it may be so. 70 But if any-
thing does turn on it, why? 
67. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (holding unconstitutional an excise tax on net profits received from sale 
of goods produced by establishments employing anyone under a certain age). 
68. See id. at 38 (1922) (Holmes, J., joining majority opinion of Taft, C.J.). 
69. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38-39 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
("What is relevant to judgment here is that, even if the history of this legislation as it went through 
Congress did not give one the libretto to the song, the context of the circumstances which brought 
forth this enactment ... emphatically supports ... that what was formally a means of raising 
revenue •. , was essentially an effort to check if not to stamp out professional gambling."). 
Vol. 1987:769] CELLOPHANE SEA 795 
The answer is that definitions (including definitions of particular 
nouns in the Constitution) are slippery sorts of things-a thing may look 
like a tax, be said (by Congress) to be a tax, have lots of the conventional 
apparatus, accompaniment, regulations, etc., common to a tax, be paya-
ble as a tax-and yet not be a tax at all. So, when is a tax not a tax, for 
constitutional purposes? When, constitutionally speaking, it is a "regula-
tion" instead. In what sense? In the obvious sense that upon fair exami-
nation, it is clear that the predominant objective of the levy upon the 
taxed activity is to influence those subject to its terms rather than to 
affect revenue. Yet, unless one imagines that a thing cannot be a "tax" if 
merely meant to influence the amount of the activity on which it is levied 
(and who says it cannot?), the ,situation is no different from the dichoto-
mous question we framed earlier. 
What one does in each case is to determine the function of the clause 
in question and identify the statute according to that match, and then 
assess the statute's substantive constitutionality accordingly, nothing 
more and nothing less. 
When is a tax not a tax? When,functionally speaking, it is a regula-
tion instead. When is a regulation of commerce not a regulation of 
"commerce"? When, functionally speaking, it is plain that Congress is 
indifferent to commerce and concerned, rather, with who is getting mar-
ried and on what grounds others are getting divorced-matters not en-
trusted to Congress's will. 
The examples can be multiplied and, with the singular exception of 
the commerce clause, judges and most writers do not take the question or 
the manner of answering it as either nonsense or as beside the point. To 
the contrary, they regard it as crucial to meaningful federalism review, 
exactly as in Bailey itself. 
Here is an equivalent example from a neighboring area of constitu-
tional review-the equal protection clause: "When is a regulation of ad-
mission by test score not a regulation of admission by test score? When, 
functionally speaking, it is a regulation of admission by something else, 
e.g., when it is a regulation by race."71 And if, functionally speaking, it 
is a regulation of admission by race, it will be constitutionally examined 
accordingly and not on some lesser or more naive basis; otherwise, the 
equal protection clause becomes a sham. 
70. See D. ENGDAHL, supra note 43, at 154. Professor Engdahl approves such thinking and 
praises Justices Black and Douglas in insisting so, see Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 100 
(1969) (Douglas and Black, JJ., dissenting), though he flatly denies the relevance of the question with 
respect to "regulations of commerce among the several states." 
71. C.f. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976). 
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In turn, what is the resolving device in all such dichotomous charac-
terizations, of which the general form is this: "When is an X not an X? 
An X is not an X when functionally speaking it is a Y." It is always the 
same device, whether called the "pretext" rule, "purpose and effect anal-
ysis," the "cellophane wrapper doctrine," or "the doctrine of constitu-
tional fraud." Applying it consists, first, in noticing the full effects of the 
law. Next, one notices too what interests evidently drove this law, i.e., 
whom it meant to affect, how and why. The inquiry itself yields the de-
scription one is thus prepared to provide. That is all one means by 
describing the law as X or as Y "functionally." Or, if one prefers, it is 
what one means by describing it "an X but an X intended to act like a Y, 
and does act like a Y, such that it is examinable for its constitutionality 
by standards controlling it as a Y, " nothing more but also nothing less. 
Alternatively still, one will say: "It comes in the cellophane wrapper of 
an X but it is a false positive X which will therefore not be credited as an 
X." The locution one selects is, perhaps, unimportant; what is important 
is to stay alert as a judge. 
So, too, exactly in Bailey. And so, too in our case as well. So the 
question put previously may not be inane and may require an answer: an 
answer, moreover, one should be equipped to provide. The sole remain-
ing puzzle, then, is how to go about the task of providing it. 
The skill necessary to provide it requires a "tenth amendment" 
sense and an "enumerated powers" sense as well. Without some sense of 
each-indeed, without some sense of each as informed by some sense of 
the other-one is at sea in total uncertainty, as much so in Bailey as in 
our immediate case. To put the same matter somewhat differently, obvi-
ously one can never know when an X is (functionally speaking) a Y un-
less one has some delimiting idea of what an X is meant to do-so one 
can form a firm impression of when a nominal X is, for constitutional 
purposes, not an X after all, but just a "false positive X " so to speak, or a 
Y dressed up in drag. In short, unless one has some notion of bona fide 
function in respect to each enumerated power vested in Congress, includ-
ing the commerce clause power, one has no useful capacity of judicial 
review. For necessarily one will be unable to deal with "false positive 
X s" or distinguish unauthorized Y s from X s in cellophane wrappers. In-
deed, one will treat them all just alike. 
Students (and a fair number of academics and judges too) have no 
trouble with this in some areas. They have never failed to see the neces-
sity for this approach in, for example, equal protection cases, in order to 
keep the Constitution intact. Many also readily see the point in cases 
such as Bailey, and even agree that that decision was well reached. 
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We revert, then, to the commerce clause itself. What range of tasks 
was assigned for possible national address by delegating to Congress the 
"power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several 
states,"72 such that one can know an X when one sees it, but such that 
one can also know a "false positive X" at the same time? 
I have written enough to try to show that there is no more reason til 
take a tax act of Congress and call it "not-a-tax" than there is to take a 
regulation of commerce and call it "not-a-regnlation-of-commerce." 
Both puzzles are driven by exactly the same set of pure, good faith, feder-
alism concerns. And a failure to treat the inquiry with equal weight will 
necessarily give away to Congress what it was not meant (and was not 
given power) to have. One must have an idea of what Congress was 
meant to be able to do by the delegation of power to regulate commerce 
among the several states-as well as an idea of what it was not meant to 
be able to do by that means-to make the doctrine of "legislative pre-
text" work. Exactly the same (no more, no less) is true of each other 
enumerated power invoked or relied upon by the national government, 
irrespective of which it happens to be.73 
From this point of view, even the word "commerce" in article I, 
section 8 merely presents the same recurring federalism challenge 
presented even by the easiest "tax" or "treaty'' case, consistent with pre-
text doctrine. So, for example, an act of Congress may be valid to carry 
into execution the obligations of a "treaty" made "under the authority of 
the United States,"74 but evidence that the whole thing is a fraud-there 
is a "treaty" but not a real treaty (i.e., the "treaty" is a charade engi-
neered to create a bootstrap for the congressional act and there were in 
fact no matters whatever at issue with the nation whose good offices have 
merely been conscripted for the fraud)-will and must carry its own 
weight in the Supreme Court. The mask of the false positive "treaty" 
thus taken away, the act also falls because it has nothing to attach to. 
Indeed, if it does not fall, i.e., if the Court turns a blind eye and thus 
colludes with Congress, federalism exists thereafter only in the cello-
phane wrappers afloat in a national political sea. 
The original Act (not just the act in its ultimate, wall-to-wall form) 
was itself the best test of these things. Was it a regulation of "com-
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
73. Here is a good example. "When is a treaty not a treaty?" Answer: when not negotiated in 
good faith to resolve an issue of shared concern with a foreign nation, but when, rather, unilaterally 
inveigled just to create a bootstrap for othenvise unauthorized acts of Congress which would then 
carry the (fake) treaty into effect. 
74. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920) (holding that acts of Congress, 
made in pursuance of a treaty, may be valid even if the acts unaided by the treaty would be beyond 
Congress's power). 
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merce " among the several states, or was it (in purpose, in effect, in arro-
gance, in what it sought, in its tenth amendment disregard) quite 
something else? I suggest it was rather plainly something else under the 
hypothesized circumstances, and easily ought to have been struck. But, 
given today's desuetude on these matters, particularly since Chief Justice 
Stone's much applauded dismissal of the tenth amendment as mere tru-
ism, 75 one cannot at all be sure. The likelihood is that it might be held 
invalid even now because its public presumption was so nakedly asserted 
and its cellophane wrapper not laid on in quite the right way. A different 
set of recitations (e.g., some convenient "findings" about permissive di-
vorce standards "affecting the national economy"), however, and likely 
the act might get by. 
If this is so, however, it is no exaggeration to suggest that the princi-
pal importance of understanding the case law of federalism today is prac-
tically confined to specialists employed by Congress: specialists who 
know best how to navigate the cellophane sea. The political task of forc-
ing each new regime of national law, subject by subject, is largely a task 
of forbearing from moving all at once (i.e., too obtusely) rather than in 
increments to which supplements may subsequently be attached,76 and in 
knowing what recitations are appropriate to include with each bill. Be-
tween one set of judges one will have reason to believe are likely to prefer 
the congressional preference reflected in the law Gudges predisposed to 
sustain it against any federalism objection if provided some colorable 
ground), and one's awareness of other judges who have mistakenly "dis-
ciplined" themselves institutionally-i.e., judges who are diffident gener-
ally when it is Congress, rather than a state legislature, that makes things 
up-the remaining task is quite slight: to move by means that seem 
unegregious at·each step and within cellophane wrappers that past cases 
provide. In that fashion, the judicial capacity to gain any clear purchase 
on any seemingly decisive distinction at any particular step is strategi-
cally undone. As with Hannibal himself, frustrated by the utter lack of 
any single clear encounter, 77 no one case seems significantly different 
from many others although all (i.e., literally everyone) understand the 
75. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 ("The [tenth] amendment states but a truism that 
all is retained which has not been surrendered."). 
76. A strategy made famous by Fabius (Quintus Fabius Maximus), the Roman general and 
statesman who avoided the temptation to try to win in a day that which he won by patience, delay 
and avoidance, over time, through the attrition of an opposing force. It was by this strategy that 
Fabius, sometimes called Cunctator (the Delayer), defeated Hannibal in the Second Punic War (218-
201 B.C.). 
77. Hannibal of Carthage crossed the Alps to invade Italy in 218 B.C., only to meet defeat at 
the hands of Fabius, who, as already noted, see supra note 76, wore Hannibal's forces down in a war 
of attrition. 
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point of what is in fact happening. Such dissent as may come from one 
or two judges in any such case will appear as a mere wail in the wind. 
To conclude on quite a different note, however, I suggest that there 
is nothing inevitable in these matters except so far as the Supreme 
Court's own practices make them inevitable, because there is in fact 
nothing distinguishing federalism review from what confronts courts 
from time to time in every area of judicial review. Our courts periodi-
cally confront cellophane wrapped packages in virtually every dimension 
of constitutionallaw.78 That much is scarcely a matter of surprise, but 
only that political certainty is a constant. Nothing else need be. It is for 
the courts themselves to say what shall come of these efforts, i.e., whether 
they will or will not get by. 
We are all aware that state legislatures are occasionally as derisive of 
establishment clause constraints on their powers, for instance, as Con-
gress often is indifferent in respect to the difference between itself and 
state legislatures in turn. Like Congress, state legislatures are quick to 
learn from judicial trends how to wrap legislation in the proper cello-
phane package. They, too, are fully prepared to move merely step by 
step. lJndoubtedly these efforts sometimes, though not often, succeed. 
When courts have been attentive the matter does not slide by, and it is 
these cases, not the (disgraceful) other cases, that have helped turn legis-
latures back to their proper tasks.79 So too should it be in respect to 
Congress. 
The critical difference that distinguishes these latter and better 
cases, moreover, is the difference we have been addressing all along. We 
have always known what it was. The critical difference is the difference 
of judicial seriousness in the performance of constitutional review. It is 
judicial seriousness in federalism review as in all areas of constitutional 
law that regulates the cellophane sea. Take it away in any area of consti-
tutional law, equivalently as has tended to happen with federalism, and 
the results would be quite equivalent as well. In the end, the matter is no 
more arcane than this. 
78. See, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984) (Christmas nativity scene erected by city 
as part of holiday celebrations served secular purpose and therefore did not offend first amendment); 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (racially segregated railroad coaches, separate but 
"equal," did not offend equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment). Neither reflects well 
on the Supreme Court itself. Cellophane wrappers, indeed. 
79. Compare Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,41 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating Kentucky law 
requiring posting of copy of the Ten Commandments as without "secular legislative purpose") with 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681; compare Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (overturning 
conviction based on discriminatory administration of facially neutral ordinance) with Plessy, 163 
U.S. at 548. 
